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RIGHTS OF PASSAGE:
AN ANALYSIS OF WAIVER OF JUVENILE
COURT JURISDICTION
Stacey Sabo*
INTRODUCTION
A thirteen-year-old Arizona girl is accused of killing the one-year-
old boy for whom she babysat. 1 The girl claims that the child fell and
struck his head on a drawer comer and then on the tiled floor.2 The
prosecution claims that she murdered him, arguing that the child's in-
juries are inconsistent with the girl's story? An eleven-member pro-
bation team unanimously recommends that the girl be adjudicated in
juvenile court, but the prosecution wants her to be tried as an adult in
criminal court.4 At a hearing, the juvenile court judge considers the
testimony of psychologists and the girl's family members and friends
in determining whether to transfer the girl to criminal court.5
The above scenario illustrates judicial waiver, the mechanism by
which a juvenile court judge may transfer a juvenile offender to crimi-
nal court jurisdiction.6 Upon the motion of the prosecutor or the ju-
venile, or on her own initiative, the judge conducts a waiver hearing to
make this determination.7 During the hearing, both sides present evi-
dence regarding a juvenile's personal circumstances and prior of-
fenses, if any.8 The judge uses this information to weigh the juvenile's
* I would like to thank Professor William Treanor for his early and continued
guidance regarding this Note, and my parents and friends for their constant support,
encouragement, and patience.
1. David Fritze, Baby Sitter Accused in Death Gets Tributes, Ariz. Republic, June
23, 1995, at B1.
2. 1d.
3. Id.
4. Id
5. Id.
6. See Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal
Court" A Case Study and Analysis of Prosecutorial Waiver, 5 Notre Dame J.L Ethics
& Pub. Pol'y 281, 284 (1991); Francis B. McCarthy, The Serious Offender and Juvenile
Court Reform: The Case for Prosecutorial Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 38 St.
Louis U. LJ. 629, 632 (1994).
7. See, eg., Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(d) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995) (stating
that "[u]pon the motion of the court or of any party, the judge ... shall conduct a
hearing to determine whether to retain jurisdiction"); La. Child. Code Ann. art.
857(A) (West 1995) (providing that "[t]he court on its own motion or on motion of
the district attorney may conduct a hearing to consider whether to transfer a child for
prosecution to the appropriate court exercising criminal jurisdiction").
8. See, eg., Ala. Code § 12-15-34(d)-(e) (1995) (requiring a written report from
probation services regarding the juvenile's offense, prior record, prior treatment, de-
meanor, maturity, and whether the juvenile's and the community's best interests re-
quire "legal restraint or discipline" for the juvenile); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(e)
(Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995) (requiring the judge to consider evidence of the serious-
ness of the offense, the juvenile's history of response to treatment, "[t]he prior his-
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potential amenability to rehabilitative treatment in juvenile court
against the danger she may pose to the community.9 If the judge finds
after the hearing that the juvenile is unsuited for treatment in the ju-
venile justice system, she may waive juvenile court jurisdiction and
transfer the case to criminal court. 10
Waiver discretion, however, is not vested solely in judges; some
states grant prosecutors that authority through prosecutorial waiver.II
Prosecutorial waiver is a statutory mechanism that provides a prosecu-
tor with exclusive discretion to choose the forum in which a juvenile
will be tried.'2 When the prosecutor's charge subjects the juvenile, by
virtue of her age and offense, to the concurrent jurisdiction of the ju-
venile and criminal courts, the prosecutor is then free to choose the
court system in which to file the case. 13 Unlike a judge, however, the
prosecutor does not hold a waiver hearing or give a written account of
her decision. Moreover, while prosecutorial decisions are subject to
review, the deference traditionally afforded those decisions makes re-
versal unlikely.' 4 Thus, the prosecutor makes the "critically impor-
tant"' 5 waiver decision outside of the adversarial process, in the
tory, character traits, mental maturity, and any other factor which reflects upon the
juvenile's prospects for rehabilitation").
9. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-2-806(1)(a) (Supp. 1995) (mandating a finding
that "it would be contrary to the best interests of the juvenile or of the public to retain
[juvenile court] jurisdiction"); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 419C.349(4) (1995) (mandating a
finding "by a preponderance of the evidence that retaining jurisdiction will not serve
the best interests of the child and of society").
10. See supra note 9.
11. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(b) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995) (providing concur-
rent juvenile and criminal court jurisdiction over certain juveniles); Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 19-2-805(1) (Supp. 1995) (same); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2301(3)(A) (1989 & Supp.
1995) (same); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.052(3)(a)(4)(a), (3)(a)(5)(a)-(b)(I) (West Supp.
1996) (same); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-5(b)(1) (1994) (same); La. Child. Code Ann.
art. 305(B)(3) (West 1995) (same); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.606 (West Supp.
1995) (same); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247 (1993) (same); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 5505(c)
(1991) (same); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-203(c), (e)-(f) (1986 & Supp. 1995) (same).
12. See Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 284-85; McCarthy, supra note 6, at 656.
This procedure is also known as "direct file." Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 284;
Catherine R. Guttman, Note, Listen to the Children: The Decision to Transfer
Juveniles to Adult Court, 30 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 507, 521 (1995).
13. See Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 284-85; McCarthy, supra note 6, at 632.
14. Frank W. Miller, Prosecution: The Decision to Charge a Suspect With a Crime
158 (1970); see infra note 165 and accompanying text.
15. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 558 (1966).
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privacy of her office, restricted only by the most basic principles of
professional ethics' 6 and the requirement of probable cause. 7
A third mechanism called legislative waiver also can channel juve-
nile defendants into criminal court. Thirty-seven states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia provide for legislative waiver, which permits the
initiation in criminal court of cases involving juveniles.' 8 Legislative
waiver statutorily excludes a juvenile from juvenile court jurisdiction 19
16. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function Standards Rule 3-
1.2(b) (1993) [hereinafter ABA Standards] (stating that "the prosecutor must exercise
sound discretion in the performance of his or her functions").
The ABA adopted this third edition of the ABA Standards in 1992. Id. at xii. The
Criminal Justice Standards Committee of the ABA initiated the revision of the ABA's
second edition in 1988. Id. at xi. Members of all areas of the criminal justice system
wrote and revised the final working draft of the ABA Standards, which was approved
by the ABA House of Delegates in 1992. Id. at xii. The ABA Standards are meant to
represent the consensus of the criminal justice community "about what good, profes-
sional practice is and should be" and to serve as "extremely useful standards for con-
sultation by lawyers and judges who want to do 'the right thing' or, as important, to
avoid doing 'the wrong thing.'" Id. at xiv.
17. Id. at 3-3.9(a) (stating that "[a] prosecutor should not institute... criminal
charges when the prosecutor knows that the charges are not supported by probable
cause").
18. Ala. Code § 12-15-34.1(a)-(b) (1995); Alaska Stat. § 47.10.010(e) (1995);
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-127(a) (West 1995); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §§ 921(2)(a)
(1975 & Supp. 1994), 1010(a) (Supp. 1994); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2307(h) (1989); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 39.052(3)(a)(1), (3)(a)(3), (3)(a)(4)(d), (3)(a)(5)(b)(l), (3)(a)(5)(c)-(d)
(West Supp. 1996); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-5(b)(2)(A) (1994); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571-
22(c)-(d) (1993); Idaho Code § 20-509(1)-(2) (Supp. 1995); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 705,
para. 405/5-4(3.1)-(3.2), (6)(a), (7)(a), (8)(a) (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1995); Ind.
Code Ann. § 31-6-2-1.1(b), (d) (BuMs Supp. 1995); Iowa Code Ann. § 232.8(1)(b)
(West 1994); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-3611(a), (c) (1995), 38-1636(h) (1993); Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 635.020(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1994); La. Child. Code Ann. art.
305(A) (West 1995); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 3101(4)(G) (West 1980); Md. Code
Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-804(e)(1)-(4) (1995 & Supp. 1995); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§§ 260.015(5)(b), 260.125(3)(a) (West Supp. 1996); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 43-21-
151(1)(a)-(b), (2) (1993 & Supp. 1995), 43-21-157(9) (Supp. 1995); Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 211.071(9) (Vernon Supp. 1996); Mont. Code Ann. § 41-5-206(3) (1995); Nev. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 62.040(1)(b)(1), 62.080(3) (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1995); N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 169-B:27 (1994); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-3(H) (Michie 1995); N.Y. Penal
Law § 30.00(2) (McKinney 1987); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-608 (1995); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. §§ 2151.011(B)(1), 2151.26(B) (Anderson Supp. 1995); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10,
§§ 7001-1.3(2), 7306-1.1(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1996); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 6322(a)
(1982 & Supp. 1995), 6355(e) (1982); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 14-1-3(1), -7.1(c) (1994 &
Supp. 1995); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-390 (1985 & Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 37-1-134(c) (Supp. 1995); Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3a-16(1), 78-3a-25(12)
(Supp. 1995); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 5505(b) (1991); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-269.6(C)
(Michie Supp. 1995); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 13.04.030(1)(e)(iv), 13.40.020(14)
(West Supp. 1996); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.183 (West Supp. 1995); see Or. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 419C.364 (1995) (permitting the criminal court judge, in a case involving a
waived juvenile aged 16 or older, to order that all further proceedings involving thejuvenile will be waived to criminal court without any juvenile court proceedings).
19. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 284; Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets
the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 471, 488 (1987).
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by virtue of her offense or by a combination of her age and offense.2 °
For instance, a fourteen-year-old girl charged with murder is automat-
ically outside juvenile court jurisdiction in Connecticut; her case can
only be filed in criminal court.21 Because the "waiver" is automatic-
the juvenile is subject to criminal court jurisdiction from the moment
she is charged-no hearing takes place to determine whether the in-
terests of the juvenile and of society will best be served by criminal
prosecution. Legislative waiver systematically places these juveniles
in criminal court, regardless of circumstances that might indicate that
some juveniles would be amenable to the rehabilitative treatment
available in the juvenile justice system.
This Note analyzes the various waiver mechanisms and contends
that judicial waiver is the only method that should be used to deter-
mine when a juvenile should be tried as an adult. Part I discusses the
juvenile justice system and its philosophical underpinnings. This part
demonstrates society's dedication to juveniles as manifested both by
the very existence of a separate system for juvenile adjudication and
by the Supreme Court's expressed concern for procedural fairness in
cases involving juveniles. Part II defines judicial, prosecutorial, and
legislative waiver and explains how each accomplishes the waiver of
juvenile court jurisdiction in favor of criminal court jurisdiction. This
part also briefly discusses reverse waiver, a method of returning a ju-
venile to juvenile court jurisdiction. Part III argues that, in light of the
necessity of affording a juvenile a full hearing before removing her
from the juvenile justice system and its attendant protections, judicial
waiver is preferable over prosecutorial or legislative waiver. Finally,
this Note concludes that the importance of procedural fairness for
juveniles necessitates that only judicial waiver be used to waive juve-
nile court jurisdiction.
I. THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM FROM 1899 TO 1996
This part chronicles the history of the juvenile justice system, begin-
ning with the doctrine of parens patriae, under which the state acts in
place of a juvenile offender's parents to rehabilitate her and provide
her with individualized treatment aimed at her best interests. Next,
this part addresses the system's ideological shift away from the proce-
durally informal aspects of the parens patriae doctrine to an emphasis
on greater procedural protections for juveniles, tracing this shift
through the landmark Supreme Court cases Kent v. United States22
and In re Gault.23 Finally, this part explores the public's criticism of
20. Eric L. Jensen, The Waiver of Juveniles to Criminal Court: Policy Goals, Em-
pirical Realities, and Suggestions for Change, 31 Idaho L. Rev. 173, 181-82 (1994);
Guttman, supra note 12, at 521.
21. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-127(a) (West 1995).
22. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
23. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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the juvenile justice system over the past three decades for its inability
to deal with increasingly violent juveniles.
A. The Creation of the Juvenile Justice System in the United States
The juvenile justice system in the United States has its roots in the
medieval English doctrine of parens patriae.A The doctrine reasoned
that "the king of England (or his agents, representatives or chancel-
lors) was figuratively the father of the country[;] as such, he assumed
almost absolute responsibility for all juvenile affairs."' 5 England's
common law presumed that juveniles under the age of seven were in-
capable of criminal intent, regardless of the seriousness of their of-
fenses, and therefore exempted them from prosecution.26 The law
could hold juveniles between the ages of eight and fourteen responsi-
ble for criminal acts upon a showing that they understood the "nature
and consequences" of those acts. 7 Juveniles over the age of fourteen
were fully subject to the criminal law.28 Under parens patriae, all "de-
cisions [made by the king's chancellors] were independent of the juris-
diction of English criminal courts." 29 This jurisdictional split likely
stemmed from the "minor mischievous" nature of the conduct that
brought the juveniles before the chancellors; the juveniles' behavior
was not necessarily criminal but rather consisted of "incorrigibility,
unmanageability, running away, loitering, trespassing, [or] poach-
ing."' 30 When a juvenile committed a more serious crime, however,
she could face adult trial and sentencing and could even receive the
death penalty.31
24. Dean J. Champion & G. Larry Mays, Transferring Juveniles to Criminal
Courts: Trends and Implications for Criminal Justice 5 (1991); Royce S. Buckingbam,
The Erosion of Juvenile Court Judge Discretion in the Transfer Decision Nationwide
and in Oregon, 29 Willamette L. Rev. 689, 691-92 (1993).
25. Champion & Mays, supra note 24, at 5.
26. Id. at 6; Margaret 0. Hyde, Juvenile Justice and Injustice 9 (1983); Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A Na-
tional Report 70 (1995) [hereinafter Juvenile Offenders and Victims]; H. Ted Rubin,
Juvenile Justice: Policy, Practice, and Law 35 (1979).
27. Hyde, supra note 26, at 9; Thomas A. Johnson, Introduction to the Juvenile
Justice System 1 (1975); Rubin, supra note 26, at 35; see Champion & Mays, supra
note 24, at 5-6.
28. Hyde, supra note 26, at 9; Johnson, supra note 27, at 1; Rubin, supra note 26,
at 35.
29. Champion & Mays, supra note 24, at 5.
30. See id. at 6.
31. Hyde, supra note 26, at 9. In a variety of English cases occurring in the late
1600s and mid-1700s involving ten-year-old juveniles, one boy was sentenced to whip-
ping for theft, another sentenced to death for mutilating and killing another child
(although he was later pardoned by the king in return for sea service), a third hanged
for burning a child in its cradle, and a fourth hanged for killing his companions. An-
other juvenile had her hand burned for committing theft. Id. at 8-11.
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The first United States juvenile court was founded in Illinois in
1899,32 and by 1945, every state had its own juvenile justice system.33
The individual state juvenile justice systems reflected England's pro-
tective sentiment toward juvenile offenders:
The doctrine [of parens patriae] was interpreted as the inherent
power and responsibility of the State to provide protection for chil-
dren whose natural parents were not providing appropriate care or
supervision because children were not of full legal capacity. A key
element was the focus on the welfare of the child. Thus, the delin-
quent child was also seen as in need of the court's benevolent
intervention.34
Thus, when a juvenile court judge assessed a juvenile offender, her job
was to determine the juvenile's individual situation.35 The judge cen-
tered her analysis on the juvenile's identity and condition rather than
her offense in order to determine "what had best be done in [her]
interest and in the interest of the state to save [her] from a downward
career." 36 The goal, then, was the rehabilitation of youthful offenders
through individualized justice,37 and the focus was on the juvenile's
best interests rather than her offense.
Three fundamental beliefs, all centered around a core ideal of indi-
vidualized treatment, anchored the philosophy of juvenile justice.38
First, juvenile offenders were regarded as inherently less guilty than
adult offenders and, therefore, more malleable.39 Second, the view
that these juveniles were less guilty and more "amenable to change"
32. Champion & Mays, supra note 24, at 6; Johnson, supra note 27, at 3.
33. Champion & Mays, supra note 24, at 6; Hyde, supra note 26, at 21.
34. Juvenile Offenders and Victims, supra note 26, at 70; see Martin L. Forst &
Martha-Eln Blomquist, Cracking Down on Juveniles: The Changing Ideology of
Youth Corrections, 5 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 323, 325 (1991).
35. See Forst & Blomquist, supra note 34, at 325.
36. Rubin, supra note 26, at 36-37 (quoting Judge Julian M. Mack of Cook County
Juvenile Court, Chicago, IL, in 1909).
37. Juvenile Offenders and Victims, supra note 26, at 71; see, e.g., Buckingham,
supra note 24, at 691-92 (stating that the juvenile justice system had a "mission of
individualized treatment"); Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court,
75 Minn. L. Rev. 691, 709 (1991) (stating that the original purpose of the juvenile
justice system emphasized "rehabilitation and the child's 'best interests' "); Forst &
Blomquist, supra note 34, at 324-27 (stating that the juvenile justice system "has
rested on a philosophy of rehabilitation and individualized justice").
38. One author has broken down the juvenile justice system's philosophy into five
elements, namely: (1) the superior rights of the state; (2) the individualization of
justice; (3) the status of delinquency (which protects children from the stigma of the
criminal label); (4) an informal, noncriminal procedure; and (5) a rehabilitative and
protective rather than punishment-oriented approach. Johnson, supra note 27, at 11-
12 & n.27 (citing Robert G. Caldwell, The Juvenile Court: Its Development and Some
Major Problems, in Juvenile Delinquency: A Book of Readings 362-63 (Rose Gial-
lombardo ed., 1966)).
39. See Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 281. This belief in the lesser culpability
of juvenile offenders likely stems from the post-sixteenth-century recognition of a fun-
damental difference between adults and children. See Juvenile Offenders and Victims,
supra note 26, at 70.
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led to a conclusion that they should be treated differently for their
crimes.4° This belief established the goal of the juvenile court as reha-
bilitation rather than punishment.41 Third, the system intended "to
protect children from the stigmatizing label of 'criminal' and from the
contamination of incarceration with hardened adult offenders."'4
Thus, the juvenile justice system provided alternatives to the har-
sher penalties meted out by criminal courts and offered a way to reha-
bilitate wayward youths without marking them as criminals. A child
adjudicated in juvenile court "was deemed not legally capable of com-
mitting a crime [and instead regarded as] in need of counsel, educa-
tion and help."'43 The state's goal was to rehabilitate the juvenile on
an individual basis and send her back into the general population
without the stigma of a criminal conviction," a solution in the best
interests of both the child and society.
In keeping with the paternalistic and nonadversarial nature of juve-
nile justice, juvenile court hearings were "much less formal than crimi-
nal court proceedings."45 The juvenile court's stated mission was to
help and protect children, not to punish them; thus, the procedural
protections provided to criminal defendants were presumed "unneces-
sary" ' because states were acting in the best interests of the child.4 7
Thus, at the time of its origin, the juvenile justice system provided a
relatively informal setting for the adjudication of juvenile offenders.
Focusing on individualized treatment, the juvenile court judge strove
to rehabilitate, not penalize, the juvenile.
40. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 281.
41. Id at 281 (stating that "rehabilitative treatment and protective supervision tra-
ditionally have been the preferred responses to juvenile misbehavior"); Hyde, supra
note 26, at 21 ("Mn Cook County, Chicago, Illinois, the child who had offended the
law ceased to be a criminal and had the status of a child who needed care, protection,
and discipline.... [O]ffenders became wards of the state and the emphasis was on
treatment rather than on punishment.").
42. Patricia M. Wald, Introduction to the Juvenile Justice Process: The Rights of
Children and the Rites of Passage, in Child Psychiatry and the Law 9, 9 (Diane H.
Schetky & Elissa P. Benedek eds., 1980). But see Hyde, supra note 26, at 3, 22, 28-29
(suggesting that juveniles placed in training homes or otherwise incarcerated are
likely to become hardened delinquents after fraternizing with the other residents).
43. Wald, supra note 42, at 9.
44. See id
45. Juvenile Offenders and Victims, supra note 26, at 70.
46. kd; Allison Boyce, Note, Choosing the Forum: Prosecutorial Discretion and
Walker v. State, 46 Ark. L. Rev. 985, 987 (1994).
47. Juvenile Offenders and Victims, supra note 26, at 70-71. But see In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that juveniles facing incarceration had the right in adjudi-
catory hearings to notice, to counsel, to confrontation of their accusers, and to protec-
tion against self-incrimination).
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B. "Emerging from Legal Limbo":48 Procedural Protections
for Juveniles
The juvenile justice system came under scrutiny from children's
rights advocates as well as from those who decried what they per-
ceived to be its undue leniency.49 The apparent arbitrariness of some
juvenile proceedings generated concern over procedural fairness in ju-
venile court.50 Two landmark Supreme Court cases, Kent v. United
States5' and In re Gault,52 fundamentally changed the juvenile justice
system, creating a more formal setting for juvenile adjudications.
Kent v. United States,53 decided in 1966, accorded procedural pro-
tections to juveniles in judicial waiver hearings. Morris Kent was a
sixteen-year-old male charged with several counts of rape and rob-
bery.54 Despite a motion for a waiver hearing by Kent's attorney, a
District of Columbia juvenile court judge waived Kent to criminal
court without such a hearing, without a description of the "full investi-
gation" upon which the judge claimed to base his decision, and with-
out discussion of the grounds for waiver.5 5 Kent argued that the
waiver was invalid and sought to have the criminal indictment dis-
missed. 6 He pursued his appeal to the Supreme Court, arguing that
the judge had not made a full investigation before waiving him to
criminal court.57
The Supreme Court agreed, finding that while the judicial waiver
statute endowed a judge with "a substantial degree of discretion" in
determining whether to waive jurisdiction, it did not grant "a license
for arbitrary procedure" or permit the judge "to determine in isola-
tion and without the participation or any representation of the child
the 'critically important' question whether a child will be deprived of
the special protections" of juvenile court.5 8 Declaring that "there is
no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous
consequences without ceremony-without hearing, without effective
48. Living with Gault, Tune, Aug. 4, 1967, at 68, 68 [hereinafter Living with
Gault].
49. See infra part I.C.
50. See, e.g., Boyce, supra note 46, at 987 (stating that "advocates of the juvenile
system attacked the lack of procedures in juvenile proceedings"); Crisis in Juvenile
Courts, U.S. News & World Rep., Mar. 24, 1969, at 62, 63 [hereinafter Crisis] (noting
that prior to the Supreme Court's holding in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), somejuvenile court judges "were sending children away-for their 'own good'-to institu-
tions for longer terms than would have been imposed on adults committing the same
offense.., often... on the basis of hearsay evidence" (quoting Chief Judge Florence
M. Kelley of the New York State Family Court)).
51. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
52. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
53. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
54. See id. at 543-44.
55. Id. at 545-46.
56. Id. at 548.
57. See id. at 552.
58. Id. at 553.
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assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons,"5 9 the Court
held that a juvenile was entitled to a hearing before being judicially
waived to criminal court as well as to a statement of the court's rea-
sons for its decision, including access to documents used by the court
in reaching its determination.60 The Court grounded its conclusion in
part on "society's special concern for children, 61 manifested by the
juvenile court's very existence. In further asserting that "the admoni-
tion to function in a 'parental' relationship [under the doctrine of
parens patriae] is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness,"' the
Kent Court set the stage for In re Gault.63
The following year, the Supreme Court decided the case of fifteen-
year-old Gerald Gault. Gault and a friend made a crank phone call to
Gault's neighbor,64 who had the boys arrested but did not herself at-
tend their adjudication hearing.65  The juvenile court never deter-
mined whether Gault or his friend had made the "obscene" remarks,6
but nonetheless committed Gault to a training school until he turned
twenty-one.67 Alleging several denials of his constitutional rights,
Gault eventually appealed to the Supreme Court.61 Appalled by the
conclusory proceedings below, the Court declared that "the condition
of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court"'69 and held that a
juvenile had a right in juvenile proceedings to notice of the pending
charges, 70 to counsel,71 to confrontation and cross-examination of wit-
nesses,7 and to protection against self-incrimination.' 3
The Court emphasized the need for procedural fairness in juvenile
proceedings, stating that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the
Bill of Rights is for adults alone."'74 The Court rejected the juvenile
59. Id. at 554.
60. Id. at 561-63. In the Kent Appendix, the Supreme Court enumerated eight
"determinative factors" for the judge's consideration in making the waiver decision.
Id. at 565-67. These factors include: the seriousness and violence of the offense;
whether it was committed against person or property; whether probable cause exists;
the desirability of trying the entire case in one court (when some of the defendants
are adults and thereby outside juvenile court jurisdiction); the juvenile's personal cir-
cumstances; her prior record, if any, public safety; and juvenile's likelihood of rehabil-
itation. I&a at 566-67.
61. Id. at 554.
62. Id- at 555.
63. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
64. Id. at 4.
65. Id. at 5.
66. Id. at 7.
67. Id. at 7-8. Had an adult committed the offense, she would have been subject
to a maximum sentence of only two months in jail or a $50 fine. Il at 8-9.
68. See id at 10-11, 13-14.
69. Id. at 28.
70. Id. at 33-34.
71. IL at 36.
72. Id. at 56.
73. Id at 55.
74. Id. at 13.
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court's practice of acting without procedural safeguards under the
parens patriae rationale that "a child, unlike an adult, has a right 'not
to liberty but to custody,' "75 but endorsed the parens patriae philoso-
phy of individualized treatment and rehabilitation, asserting that "the
observance of due process standards, intelligently and not ruthlessly
administered, will not compel the States to abandon or displace any of
the substantive benefits of the juvenile process. '76
After Gault, the Supreme Court continued to monitor the status of
juvenile rights. In In re Winship,77 the Court held that the state must
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt in delinquency adjudica-
tions. 8 In Breed v. Jones,79 the Court determined that adjudication
for the same offense in both juvenile and criminal court violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause.80
The procedural changes mandated by the Supreme Court in Kent,
Gault, Winship, and Breed provided to juveniles the best of both
worlds by giving them adult procedural protections in the rehabilita-
tive juvenile court.8' As a result of these decisions, juvenile court lost
some of its informality, yet still shielded juveniles with adult-like pro-
cedural protections while retaining its individualized, rehabilitative
focus.
C. Public Criticism Pushes the Juvenile Justice System into a
New Era
The vision of "a nonpunitive setting in which a wayward child and
[her] parents could discuss their problem, be counseled by a wise pa-
triarchical juvenile judge, and go away redeemed, not to sin again"' 8
eventually came into conflict with the realities of prevailing public
sentiment and juvenile conduct. In the 1950s and 1960s, the public's
confidence in juvenile court's ability to rehabilitate delinquent
75. Id. at 17.
76. Id. at 21.
77. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
78. Id. at 368.
79. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
80. Id. at 541.
81. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) (observing that in juvenile
court, "there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both
worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care
and regenerative treatment postulated for children"); Living with Gault, supra note
48, at 68 ("By incorporation of constitutional safeguards [in the] system, individual-
ized justice can become a reality." (quoting Denver, CO, juvenile court Judge Ted
Rubin)).
82. Wald, supra note 42, at 9.
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juveniles began to wane.' Juvenile crime seemed rampant," and
"[d]awning everywhere [was] the realization that juvenile courts as
created by the social reformers . . . [were] not living up to their
blueprints." 85 Since the 1970s, further increases in juvenile crime and
arrests86 have led to even greater dissatisfaction with the juvenile
court system.' Critics have attacked the system for its leniency in
meting out punishment' and have lobbied for harsher treatment of
juvenile offenders.89 Many states have responded to these demands
83. Juvenile Offenders and Victims, supra note 26, at 71; see also Hercules Al Cav-
alier, Juvenile Courts and Delinquents, Catholic World, May 1955, at 110, 111 (positing
that "[n]ot only is common sense and parental experience disregarded in Juvenile
Court proceedings, but the constitutional rights of the youthful offenders and the safe-
guards of due process of law are ignored"); Youth Crime-Some Suggested Treat-
ments, U.S. News & World Rep., Nov. 15, 1965, at 46, 46 (criticizing "the cloak of
secrecy wrapped around... youthful criminals by the protection of the juvenile
philosophy").
84. See, e.g., An Even Bigger Crime Explosion?, U.S. News & World Rep., Oct. 7,
1968, at 16, 16 ("Is rampant crime... only the prelude to an even bigger explosion, as
last year's 1 million or more U.S. delinquents move into adulthood in years ahead?");
Crisis, supra note 50, at 62 ("Across the nation, juvenile justice is moving into its
biggest overhaul since the turn of the century."); The Explosion in Teen-Age Crimes,
U.S. News & World Rep., Oct. 9, 1967, at 74, 74 ("Deep worry is developing.., over
juvenile delinquency that seems to be getting out of hand across the United States.").
85. Crisis, supra note 50, at 62.
86. Commentators debate whether crime rates have actually increased or whether
the police are simply making more arrests. Compare McCarthy, supra note 6, at 636
(asserting that "by almost any measure, juvenile crime has been on the increase dur-
ing the past decade [1984-1994]") with Guttman, supra note 12, at 508 (positing that
"research does not support the notion that juveniles are committing more violent
crimes today nor that they commit a larger proportion of crime [than do adults]").
John Wilson, acting administrator of the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, maintains that the proportion of juveniles com-
mitting violent crimes has remained constant since 1965, with juveniles committing
"one out of every eight violent crimes," and that "less than half of one percent of all
10-17 year-olds in the United States were arrested for a violent offense." Treatment of
Juveniles in the Criminal Justice System: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-14 (1994) [herein-
after Hearings] (statement of John J. Wilson).
87. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 282; Guttman, supra note 12, at 515 (foot-
notes omitted); Coming: Tougher Approach to Juvenile Violence, U.S. News & World
Rep., June 7, 1976, at 65, 65 (criticizing the juvenile courts for "neither punish[ing]
juvenile criminals nor reform[ing] or help[ing] them") [hereinafter Tougher Ap-
proach]; Upsurge in Violent Crime by Youngsters, U.S. News & World Rep., July 17,
1978, at 55, 55 (declaring that "[v]ast reforms are urgently needed in the juvenile-
justice system in order to deal with an alarming spiral of violent crimes committed by
teen-agers").
88. See e.g., Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 282 (noting that "[d]ramatic in-
creases in juvenile crime in the 1970s" created public clamor "for the adoption of
punishment-oriented policies and practices" (footnotes omitted)); Charles E.
Springer, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court, 5 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y
397, 398 (1991) (proposing a "rehabilitated juvenile court" that would "administer[ ]
real justice in its traditional retributive" sense); Tougher Approach, supra note 87, at
65 (censuring the juvenile courts for not punishing juvenile offenders).
89. Guttman, supra note 12, at 515 (footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Tougher Ap-
proach, supra note 87, at 65 (relating that under proposed juvenile court reforms,
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by proposing90 or promulgating9' new laws which facilitate the waiver
of juvenile court jurisdiction and allow more juveniles to be tried in
criminal court.
II. WAIVER OF JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION
This part explains the three basic waiver mechanisms-judicial,
prosecutorial, and legislative-and how each establishes criminal
court jurisdiction over a juvenile offender. This part first examines
judicial waiver, prosecutorial waiver, and legislative waiver, and the
circumstances under which each mechanism operates. Next, the part
briefly analyzes reverse waiver, a statutory waiver mechanism that
transfers to juvenile court a juvenile whose case was originally waived
to criminal court.
A. Judicial Waiver
Judicial waiver permits a juvenile court judge to waive juvenile
court jurisdiction when, after a hearing, the judge determines that suf-
ficient evidence supports the conclusion that the juvenile committed
the charged offense and that the juvenile would not be amenable to
juvenile court treatment. Forty-seven states and the District of Co-
lumbia have judicial waiver statutes.92 Cases involving younger
"[c]ourts would deal more harshly with violent juvenile criminals"); Crisis, supra note
50, at 62 (noting that "[a]cross the nation ... [t]here are growing signs of a sterner
philosophy than has prevailed in the past when it comes to dealing with youthful
troublemakers").
90. See, e.g., J.W. Brown, Juvenile Justice Overhaul; Prosecutor to Say If Adult
Trial Needed, Ariz. Republic, Nov. 15, 1995, at Al (detailing the Romley/Foremanjuvenile justice proposal, including a provision for prosecutorial waiver allowing pros-
ecutors "to decide whether young defendants will be tried as adults"); Laurence Ham-
mack, Poll at Odds with Allen Panel's Stance on 'Young Thugs', Roanoke Tunes, Oct.
14, 1995, at Cl (stating that Virginia's Governor Allen planned a juvenile court re-
form which would allow prosecutors "to seek adult trials for juveniles younger than
fourteen"); Doris Sue Wong, Many Agree Serious Juvenile Cases Require Court
Changes, Boston Globe, Sept. 12, 1995, at 18 (explaining plans by Massachusetts At-
torney General Scott Harshbarger and Governor Weld to eliminate transfer hearings
altogether).
91. Since 1978, Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin have passed
laws enlarging the pool of juveniles who may be sent to criminal court. United States
General Accounting Office, Juvenile Justice: Juveniles Processed in Criminal Court
and Case Dispositions 19 & n.16 (1995) [hereinafter GAO Report].
92. Ala. Code § 12-15-34 (1995); Alaska Stat. § 47.10.060 (1995); Ariz. R. Juv. P.
12, 14 (Supp. 1995); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(d) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); Cal.
Welf. & Inst. Code § 707 (West 1984 & Supp. 1996); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-2-806(Supp. 1995); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-127(b) (West 1995); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10,
§ 1010(b)-(c) (1975 & Supp. 1994); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2307(a) (1989 & Supp.
1995); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.052(2) (West Supp. 1996); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-39
(1994); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571-22(a)-(c) (1993); Idaho Code § 20-508 (Supp. 1995); Ill.
Ann. Stat. ch. 705, para. 405/5-4 (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1995); Ind. Code Ann.
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juveniles who have committed less violent offenses usually originate in
juvenile court;93 the juvenile court may then waive its jurisdiction in
favor of criminal court prosecution. Some jurisdictions permit the
prosecutor, the juvenile, or the judge herself to request a judicial
waiver hearing once a case is filed in juvenile court.9 At the waiver
hearing both the state and the juvenile, usually with the assistance of
counsel,' have an opportunity to present information to the judge re-
garding the juvenile's amenability to juvenile court treatment.96 The
judge considers this evidence in light of various statutory criteria97 and
only then decides whether to waive juvenile court jurisdiction.
§ 31-6-2-4 (Bums 1987 & Supp. 1995); Iowa Code Ann. § 232.45 (West 1994 & Supp.
1995); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-1636 (1993); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 635.020, 640.010
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990 & Supp. 1994); La. Child. Code Ann. art. 857 (West
1995); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 3101(4) (West 1980 & Supp. 1995); Md. Code
Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-817 (1995); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 119, § 61 (Law. Co-op.
1994); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 712A.4 (West 1993); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 260.125
(West 1992 & Supp. 1996); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-157 (1993 & Supp. 1995); Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 211.071 (Vernon 1983 & Supp. 1996); Mont. Code Ann. § 41-5-206
(1995); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 62.080 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1995); N.-L Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 169-B'24 (1994 & Supp. 1995); NJ. Stat. Ann. § 2A4A-26 (West 1987 & Supp.
1995); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-608 (1995); N.D. Cent. Code § 27-20-34 (1991 & Supp.
1995); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.26 (Anderson 1994 & Supp. 1995); Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 10, § 7303-4.3(B) (West Supp. 1996); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 419C.349,
419C.352 (1995); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6355 (1982); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 14-1-7
(1994), 14-1-7.1 (1994 & Supp. 1995); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 20-7-430(3)-(6) (Law. Co-
op. 1985 & Supp. 1995), 20-7-430(9) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); S.D. Codified Laws
Ann. § 26-11-4 (1992 & Supp. 1995); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-134 (1991 & Supp.
1995); Tex. Faro. Code Ann. § 54.02 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996); Utah Code Ann. § 78-
3a-25 (1992 & Supp. 1995); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 5506 (1991); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-
269.1 (Michie Supp. 1995); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 13.40.110 (West 1993); W. Va.
Code § 49-5-10 (1995 & Supp. 1995); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.18 (West Supp. 1995); Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 14-6-237 (1986 & Supp. 1995).
93. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(a) (Michie Supp. 1995) (vesting the juve-
nile court with exclusive jurisdiction when the case involves a juvenile who was: (1)
younger than 14 when the alleged delinquent act occurred; (2) younger than 16 when
she allegedly engaged in a nonviolent felony or who is not a habitual juvenile of-
fender, (3) younger than 18 when she allegedly engaged in conduct constituting an
adult misdemeanor); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-203(d) (1986 & Supp. 1995) (vesting the
juvenile court with exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases involving juveniles
under age 13 who allegedly committed felonies or misdemeanors punishable by more
than six months of imprisonment).
94. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(d) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995) (provid-
ing that the judge or "any party" may move for a waiver hearing); Idaho Code § 20-
508(2) (Supp. 1995) (stating that the prosecutor, judge, or juvenile may institute a
waiver hearing).
95. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966) (declaring that "there is no
place in our system of law" for making the waiver determination "without effective
assistance of counsel"). But see Juvenile Offenders and Victims, supra note 26, at 71
(noting that in some jurisdictions, "attorneys for the State and the youth are not con-
sidered essential to the operation of the system, especially in less serious cases").
96. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 561 (holding that "an opportunity for a hearing which
may be informal, must be given the child prior to entry of a waiver order").
97. See infra text accompanying notes 98-101.
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Almost all judicial waiver statutes require a juvenile court judge to
consider certain delineated factors before making the waiver deci-
sion.18 While the most basic requirement for judicial waiver is that the
evidence support the allegations, an overwhelming majority of judicial
waiver jurisdictions provide a list of discrete factors regarding a juve-
nile's personal circumstances and other potentially mitigating factors
that judges must consider.9 9 For instance, the Florida judicial waiver
statute calls for a consideration of the offense's nature and serious-
ness, the community welfare, whether the offense was against person
or property, whether probable cause exists, the juvenile's sophistica-
tion, maturity, previous history and record, the effect of treatment in
juvenile court upon the public's safety, and the likelihood of the juve-
nile's rehabilitation if she is adjudicated in juvenile court.100 Similarly,
Michigan judges must consider the juvenile's prior record, character,
maturity, and pattern of living, the seriousness of the offense, and
whether the offense is one of a repetitive pattern casting doubt on the
likelihood that the treatment available in the juvenile system will be
successful.101 Even in cases where the judge is not bound to consider
enumerated criteria, she must still hold a full hearing and determine
that the evidence reasonably supports the charge prior to making the
98. See infra text accompanying notes 99-103.
99. Thirty-eight jurisdictions provide such considerations in their judicial waiver
statutes. Ala. Code § 12-15-34(d) (1995); Ariz. R. Juv. P. 14(c), (d)(1), (e) (Supp.
1995); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(e) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); Cal. Welf. & Inst.
Code § 707 (West 1984 & Supp. 1996); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-2-806(3)(b) (Supp. 1995);
Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1010(c) (Supp. 1994); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2307(e) (1989 &
Supp. 1995); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.052(2)(c) (West Supp. 1996); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571-
22(b) (1993); Idaho Code § 20-508(8) (Supp. 1995); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 705, para. 405/5-
4(3)(b) (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1995); Ind. Code Ann. § 31-6-2-4(b)-(f) (Bums
1987 & Supp. 1995); Iowa Code Ann. § 232.45(7) (West 1994); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-
1636(e) (1993); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 640.010(2)(b) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990 &
Supp. 1994); La. Child. Code Ann. art. 862(A)(2) (West 1995); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
tit. 15, § 3101(4)(D) (West Supp. 1995); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-817(d)
(1995); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 119, § 61 (Law. Co-op. 1994); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 712A.4(4) (West 1993); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-157(5) (1993 & Supp. 1995); Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 211.071(6) (Vernon Supp. 1996); Mont. Code Ann. § 41-5-206(1)-(2)
(1995); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169-B:24(I) (Supp. 1995); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:4A-
26(a)(1)-(2) (West 1987 & Supp. 1995); N.D. Cent. Code § 27-20-34(1)-(3) (Supp.
1995); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.26(C)(1)-(2) (Anderson Supp. 1995); Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 10, § 7303-4.3(B) (West Supp. 1996); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 419C.349(4)
(1995); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6355(a) (1982); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 14-1-7.1 (1994 &
Supp. 1995), 14-1-7.2 (1994); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 26-11-4 (1992 & Supp. 1995);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-134(b) (1991 & Supp. 1995); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(0
(West 1986 & Supp. 1996); Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-25(4) (Supp. 1995); W. Va. Code
§ 49-5-10(g) (Supp. 1995); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.18(5) (West 1987 & Supp. 1995); Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 14-6-237(b) (1986 & Supp. 1995). Many of the criteria for consideration
in these judicial waiver statutes are similar to the eight "determinative factors" enu-
merated by the Supreme Court in its Appendix to Kent v. United States. See 383 U.S.
541, 566-67 (1966); supra note 60.
100. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.052(2)(c) (West Supp. 1996).
101. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 712A.4(4) (West 1993).
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waiver decision.'0 The judge often must accompany the waiver order
with written findings explaining her reasoning.' 3 This order may be
reviewed on appeal, should either party wish to challenge the rul-
ing.'" Thus, judicial waiver statutes restrain a judge's discretion while
providing for a full consideration of a juvenile's best interests.
B. Prosecutorial Waiver
Ten states empower prosecutors to choose the forum in which to try
juvenile offenders' 0 5 when both the juvenile and criminal courts have
jurisdiction over a juvenile suspect by virtue of her age and the nature
of her alleged crime. 106 The prosecutor may, at her broad discretion,
file the case directly in either court.10 7 The process involves two de-
terminations. First, the prosecutor determines the charge.ls Second,
if that charge places the juvenile within the concurrent jurisdiction of
the two court systems, the prosecutor next decides whether to file the
case in juvenile court or to "direct file" it in criminal court.109
Prosecutorial waiver statutes will often specify the combination of
age and offense warranting the exercise of the prosecutor's filing dis-
cretion. Colorado's prosecutorial waiver statute, for example, has sev-
eral age and offense combinations providing for waiver to criminal
102. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-608 (1995) (leaving the waiver decision solely to
the judge's discretion after a hearing and a finding of probable cause, except in the
case of an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-
269.1(A)(4) (Michie Supp. 1995) (requiring a hearing before any transfer from juve-
nile court but not requiring a consideration of mitigating circumstances in all hear-
ings); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 5506(d) (1991) (stating that after the hearing, "the court
may consider, among other matters" seven mitigating factors (emphasis added)).
103. See, eg., Ala. Code § 12-15-34(f) (1995) (requiring that the court set forth in
writing its reasons for a transfer); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2307(d) (1989 & Supp. 1995)
(requiring that a statement of the judge's reasons for the waiver accompany the or-
der); Iowa Code Ann. § 232.45(8) (West 1994) (requiring that the court "make and
file written findings" of "its reasons for waiving its jurisdiction").
104. See, eg., Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(h) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995) (stating
that "[a]ny party may appeal from [the judge's] order granting or denying the transfer
of a case"); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.052(2)(e) (West Supp. 1996) (stating that the judge's
waiver order shall be reviewable upon appeal).
105. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(b) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 19-2-805(1) (Supp. 1995); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2301(3)(A) (1989 & Supp. 1995);
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.052(3)(a)(4)(a), (3)(a)(5)(a)-(b)(I) (West Supp. 1996); Ga. Code
Ann. § 15-11-5(b)(1) (1994); La. Child. Code Ann. art. 305(B)(3) (West 1995); Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.606 (West Supp. 1995); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247 (1993); Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 5505(c) (1991); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-203(c), (e)-(f) (1986 &
Supp. 1995).
106. See infra notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
107. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 284-85; McCarthy, supra note 6, at 632.
Concurrent jurisdiction exists when both the juvenile and criminal courts are compe-
tent to try the alleged offender. Some commentators term this mechanism "direct
fie." GAO Report, supra note 91, at 5; Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 284.
108. See ABA Standards, supra note 16, 3-3.4, -3.9.
109. See GAO Report, supra note 91, at 5; Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6. at 284-
85; McCarthy, supra note 6, at 632.
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court of only the most dangerous or recidivist juveniles. 110 Similarly,
in Arkansas, both the juvenile and criminal courts have concurrent
jurisdiction over a fourteen- or fifteen-year-old juvenile only when she
is charged with one of several enumerated, particularly violent acts
constituting adult felonies such as capital murder, kidnapping, or
rape."' When the juvenile reaches sixteen, however, the juvenile and
criminal courts share jurisdiction when the juvenile is charged with
any act constituting an adult felony."' Thus, if a fourteen-year-old
juvenile kills her classmate, both courts have jurisdiction over her, and
the prosecutor decides where to fie the case. 1 3 If, however, the juve-
nile commits a nonenumerated felony, the courts have concurrent ju-
risdiction only if she is sixteen or older." 4 District of Columbia
prosecutors can directly fie a juvenile case in criminal court only
when the juvenile is sixteen or older and charged with a serious, vio-
lent felony;" 5 in Louisiana and Michigan, the juvenile need only be
fifteen."' While Georgia prosecutors can directly file a juvenile case
in criminal court when the juvenile has committed a serious, violent
felony for which a criminal court could sentence her to life imprison-
ment or death regardless of the juvenile's age, 1 7 Vermont's legislature
has made the opposite choice. Vermont prosecutors can directly file
only the less serious cases in criminal court, and the juvenile must be
sixteen or seventeen"18
110. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-2-805 (Supp. 1995).
111. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(b)(2) (Miechie Supp. 1995). Arkansas courts also
have concurrent jurisdiction over 14- and 15-year-old juveniles who have allegedly
committed the adult felonies of murder in the first or second degree, aggravated rob-
bery, battery in the first or second degree, possession of a handgun on school prop-
erty, aggravated assault, terroristic act, unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle,
any felony committed with a firearm, soliciting a minor to join a criminal street gang,
criminal use of prohibited weapons, or a felony attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to
commit capital murder, murder in the first or second degree, kidnapping, aggravated
robbery, rape, or battery in the first degree. Id. The courts also have concurrent juris-
diction in two other situations where the juvenile is 14 and has committed a felony
involving a handgun or a felony after having been adjudicated as a juvenile delinquent
three times in the preceding two years for acts that would have been felonies if com-
mitted by an adult. Id. § 9-27-318(b)(3)-(4).
112. Id § 9-27-318(b)(1).
113. Id. § 9-27-318(b)(2).
114. Id. § 9-27-318(b)(1). Florida's prosecutorial waiver statute is similar to Arkan-
sas's in terms of its age and offense categories. See Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 39.052(3)(a)(4)(a), (3)(a)(5)(a)-(b)(I) (West Supp. 1996).
115. D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2301(3)(A) (1989 & Supp. 1995).
116. La. Child. Code Ann. art. 305(B) (West 1995); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 600.606 (West Supp. 1995).
117. Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-5(b)(1) (1994). The criminal court, however, has ex-
clusive jurisdiction over 13- to 17-year-old juveniles charged with murder, voluntary
manslaughter, rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated child molestation, aggravated
sexual battery, or armed robbery if committed with a firearm. Id. § 15-11-5(b)(2)(A).
118. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 5505(c) (1991). Offenses that cannot be directly
filed in criminal court include arson causing death, assault and robbery with a danger-
ous weapon or causing bodily injury, aggravated assault, murder, manslaughter, kid-
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Prosecutorial waiver does not require the prosecutor to petition the
court for a waiver hearing, nor does it require her to consider the
juvenile's best interests. The prosecutor herself determines the court
in which to file the case." 9 Although the choice of forum is "critically
important,"'"0 the prosecutor often has little statutory guidance re-
garding what criteria she should consider in making a waiver decision.
Of the ten jurisdictions with prosecutorial waiver statutes,12 1 only Ne-
braska and Wyoming provide prosecutors with waiver considera-
tions. 2 Furthermore, while Wyoming prosecutors must consult these
napping, maiming, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, or nighttime burglary of
sleeping apartments. Id.
119. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
120. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 558 (1966).
121. See supra note 105.
122. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-276 (1993); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-6-203(f)(iii), 14-6-
237(b) (1986 & Supp. 1995).
In Nebraska, in cases of concurrent jurisdiction or when the juvenile is under age
16, the prosecutor shall consider
(1) The type of treatment such juvenile would most likely be amenable to;
(2) whether there is evidence that the alleged offense included violence or
was committed in an aggressive and premeditated manner,
(3) the motivation for the commission of the offense;
(4) the age of the juvenile and the ages and circumstances of any others
involved in the offense;
(5) the previous history of the juvenile, including whether he or she had
been convicted of any previous offenses or adjudicated in juvenile court,
and, if so, whether such offenses were crimes against the person or relat-
ing to property, and other previous history of antisocial behavior, if any,
including any patterns of physical violence;
(6) the sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by consid-
eration of his or her home, school activities, emotional attitude and de-
sire to be treated as an adult, pattern of living, and whether he or she has
had previous contact with law enforcement agencies and courts and the
nature thereof;
(7) whether there are facilities particularly available to the juvenile court for
treatment and rehabilitation of the juvenile;
(8) whether the best interests of the juvenile and the security of the public
may require that the juvenile continue in custody or under supervision
for a period extending beyond his or her minority and, if so, the avail-
able alternatives best suited to this purpose; and
(9) such other matters as the county attorney deems relevant to his or her
decision.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-276 (1993). Though Nebraska requires the prosecutor to con-
sider mitigating circumstances, the statutory language skews the consideration to-
wards the best interests of the community, not the child.
Wyoming's prosecutorial waiver statute requires a prosecutor to consider similar
"determinative factors" only when the case falls within the juvenile and criminal
courts' concurrent jurisdiction and the juvenile is 17. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-
203(f)(iii) (1986 & Supp. 1995). Again, however, the balancing of interests favors
"the protection of the community." Il § 14-6-237(b)(i). These considerations are:
(i) The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether
the protection of the community required waiver,
(ii) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated or willful manner,
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considerations in only one of five situations in which the juvenile and
criminal courts have concurrent jurisdiction, 23 Wyoming judges must
evaluate them in every judicial waiver proceeding.2 4 Thus,
prosecutorial waiver endows prosecutors with wide latitude in making
the waiver decision.
In the absence of express considerations within the prosecutorial
waiver statute itself, a prosecutor usually relies on other criteria in
determining where to file a case. Because some state appellate courts
view the filing decision as within a prosecutor's charging discretion, 125
a prosecutor might employ typical criminal charging considerations in
determining where to file a juvenile case. The prosecutor's first task
in deciding where to file the case 126 is to determine if sufficient evi-
(iii) Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property,
greater weight being given to offenses against persons especially if personal
injury resulted;
(iv) The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one
(1) court when the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults who
will be charged with a crime;
(v) The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by
consideration of [her] home, environmental situation, emotional attitude
and pattern of living;
(vi) The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous
contacts with the law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts and other juris-
dictions, prior periods of probation to this court, or prior commitments to
juvenile institutions;
(vii) The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likeli-
hood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if [she] is found to have
committed the alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services and facili-
ties currently available to the juvenile court.
Id. § 14-6-237(b)(i)-(vii).
123. Those five situations are: (1) violations of municipal ordinances; (2) misde-
meanors for which the maximum penalty is less than six months of imprisonment; (3)
cases in which the juvenile has reached age 17; (4) cases in which the juvenile has
reached age 14 and is charged with a violent felony; (5) cases in which the juvenile has
reached age 14, is charged with a felony, and has previously been twice adjudicated
delinquent for committing adult crimes. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-203(f)(i)-(v) (1986 &
Supp. 1995). Only in the third circumstance must a prosecutor consider mitigating
factors before she decides where to file the case. Id. § 14-6-203(f)(iii).
124. Id. § 14-6-237(b) (Supp. 1995).
125. See, e.g., Hansen v. State, 904 P.2d 811, 818-19 (Wyo. 1995) (stating that Wyo-
ming prosecutors have discretion to determine what charges to file and to choose the
court in which to file those charges); Myers v. District Court, 518 P.2d 836, 838 (Colo.
1974) (en banc) (holding that because "a prosecutor has constitutional power to exer-
cise [her] discretion in deciding which of several possible charges to press in a prose-
cution," she may properly choose the court in which to fie those charges); Juvenile
Offenders and Victims, supra note 26, at 87 (stating that "[s]tate appellate courts have
taken the view that prosecutorial discretion is equivalent to the routine charging deci-
sions made in criminal cases").
126. See generally Miller, supra note 14, at 151-345 ("Part IV: Discretion and the
Charging Decision"). The ABA Standards set out similar considerations for choosing
not to institute criminal proceedings:
(b) The prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the evidence
might support. The prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good
cause consistent with the public interest decline to prosecute, notwithstand-
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dence supports the complaint's allegations.' 27 This determination is
the most basic element of any charge." After ascertaining that such
evidence exists, the prosecutor may then properly consider such fac-
tors as the dangerousness of the offense, 9 the juvenile's prior rec-
ord,'130 her age,131 and her amenability to juvenile court treatment.1 3
C. Legislative Waiver
Legislative waiver, also known as statutory exclusion, 33 categori-
cally excludes from juvenile court jurisdiction certain juveniles or of-
fenses.' 34 These cases must be tried in criminal court. Thirty-seven
states and the District of Columbia have legislative waiver statutes. 35
ing that sufficient evidence may exist which would support a conviction. Il-
lustrative of the factors which the prosecutor may properly consider in
exercising his or her discretion are:(i) the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty;,
(ii) the extent of the harm caused by the offense;
(iii) the disproportion of the authorized punishment in relation to the
particular offense or the offender,
(iv) possible improper motives of a complainant;
(v) reluctance of the victim to testify;
(vi) cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or conviction of
others; and
(vii) availability and likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction.
ABA Standards, supra note 16, at 3-3.9(b)(i)-(vii).
127. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct require that a prosecutor "refrain
from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable
cause." Model Rules of Professional Conduct 3.8(a) (1994). Similarly, the ABA Stan-
dards require probable cause to institute criminal proceedings. ABA Standards, supra
note 16, at 3-3.9(a). In the same vein, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
advises prosecutors to "use restraint in the discretionary exercise of governmental
powers, such as in the selection of cases to prosecute." Model Code of Professional
Responsibility EC 7-13 (1981).
128. See ABA Standards, supra note 16, at 3-3.9(a).
129. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 295; see ABA Standards, supra note 16, at 3-
3.9(b)(ii).
130. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 299.
131. IL
132. Id. at 301.
133. See GAO Report, supra note 91, at 5; Guttman, supra note 12, at 521.
134. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 284; Feld, supra note 19, at 488; see GAO
Report, supra note 91, at 5.
135. Ala. Code § 12-15-34.1(a)-(b) (1995); Alaska Stat. § 47.10.010(e) (1995);
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-127(a) (West 1995); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §§ 921(2)(a)
(1975 & Supp. 1994), 1010(a) (Supp. 1994); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2307(h) (1989); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 39.052(3)(a)(1), (3)(a)(3), (3)(a)(4)(d), (3)(a)(5)(b)(II), (3)(a)(5)(c)-(d)
(West Supp. 1996); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-5(b)(2)(A) (1994); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571-
22(c)-(d) (1993); Idaho Code § 20-509(1)-(2) (Supp. 1995); I. Ann. Stat. ch. 705,
para. 405/5-4(3.1)-(3.2), (6)(a), (7)(a), (8)(a) (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1995); Ind.
Code Ann. § 31-6-2-1.1(b), (d) (Burns Supp. 1995); Iowa Code Ann. § 232.8(1)(b)
(West 1994); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-3611(a), (c) (1995), 38-1636(h) (1993); Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 635.020(4) (Mlchie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1994); La. Child. Code Ann. art.
305(A) (West 1995); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 3101(4)(G) (West 1980); Md. Code
Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-804(e)(1)-(4) (1995 & Supp. 1995); Minn. Stat. Ann.
99 260.015(5)(b), 260.125(3)(a) (West Supp. 1996); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-
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These statutes typically focus on juveniles who have committed capital
or violent offenses. 36 In some states, for instance, if a juvenile is six-
teen or older and is charged with murder, she must automatically be
tried in criminal court. 37 In other states, the minimum age is lower,
and the offenses compelling criminal court adjudication may range
from murder to arson.'3 In still other states, if the juvenile has al-
ready been convicted of a crime or has been previously adjudicated
delinquent a certain number of times and is presently charged with an
excludable offense, she must automatically be tried in criminal
court.
139
Legislative waiver thus targets the offense and, except for the juve-
nile's age,' 40 does not consider the juvenile's individual circum-
stances.14' This type of waiver excludes juveniles on purely statutory
151(1)(a)-(b), (2) (1993 & Supp. 1995), 43-21-157(9) (Supp. 1995); Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 211.071(9) (Vernon Supp. 1996); Mont. Code Ann. § 41-5-206(3) (1995); Nev. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 62.040(1)(b)(1), 62.080(3) (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1995); N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 169-B:27 (1994); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-3(H) (Michie 1995); N.Y. Penal
Law § 30.00(2) (McKinney 1987); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-608 (1995); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. §§ 2151.011(B)(1), 2151.26(B) (Anderson Supp. 1995); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10,
§§ 7001-1.3(2), 7306-1.1(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1996); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 6322(a)
(1982 & Supp. 1995), 6355(e) (1982); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 14-1-3(1), -7.1(c) (1994 &
Supp. 1995); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-390 (1985 & Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 37-1-134(c) (Supp. 1995); Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3a-16(1), 78-3a-25(12)
(Supp. 1995); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 5505(b) (1991); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-269.6(C)
(Michie Supp. 1995); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 13.04.030(1)(e)(iv), 13.40.020(14)(West Supp. 1996); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.183 (West Supp. 1995); see Or. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 419C.364 (1995) (permitting the criminal court judge, in a case involving a
waived juvenile aged 16 or older, to order that all further proceedings involving the
juvenile will be waived to criminal court without any juvenile court proceedings).
136. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at 284.
137. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 12-15-34.1(a) (1995) (stating that "any person who has
attained the age of 16 years at the time of the conduct charged and who is charged
with the commission of any act or conduct, which if committed by an adult would
constitute [a capital offense], shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of juvenile court
but shall be charged, arrested, and tried as an adult"); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10,
§§ 7001-1.3(1), 7306-1.1(A) (West Supp. 1995) (stating that "[a]ny person sixteen (16)
... years of age who is charged with murder... shall be considered as an adult" and
thus automatically subject to criminal court jurisdiction).
138. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-127(a) (West 1995) (excluding juveniles
14 and older charged with capital or serious felonies); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-
5(b)(2)(A) (1994) (excluding juveniles 13 and older charged with murder or other
violent felonies).
139. See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 3101(4)(G) (West 1980) (stating that
"[i]n all prosecutions for subsequent crimes, any person bound over and convicted as
an adult shall be proceeded against as if [she] were an adult"); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 169-B:27 (1994) (requiring that "[a]ny minor who has been tried and convicted as an
adult shall henceforth be treated as an adult"); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 13.04.030
(1)(e)(iv), 13.40.020 (West Supp. 1996) (stating that the adult criminal courts have
"exclusive original jurisdiction" when the juvenile is 16 or 17, has committed a violent
offense, and has a criminal history of "[o]ne or more prior serious violent offenses,"
"two or more prior violent offenses," or "three or more of any combination of" cer-
tain felonies, vehicular assault, and manslaughter in the second degree).
140. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
141. See Feld, supra note 37, at 701, 708; Guttman, supra note 12, at 522.
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criteria and is not discretionary.' 42 The rationale behind legislative
waiver is simple: charge serious, violent, or persistent juvenile offend-
ers like adult criminals.
D. Reverse Waiver
Reverse waiver simply permits the transfer of juveniles from crimi-
nal court to juvenile court jurisdiction, just as judicial waiver permits
the transfer of juveniles from juvenile court to criminal court jurisdic-
tion. If a prosecutor originally files a juvenile's case in criminal court,
that court may conduct a hearing regarding whether the juvenile
should be transferred to juvenile court.143 Similarly, reverse waiver
can also take place when a juvenile's case has been originally filed in
criminal court through legislative waiver.'" Alternatively, if she has
already been waived to criminal court jurisdiction under a judicial
waiver statute, reverse waiver permits the juvenile to appeal the deci-
sion in the hopes of returning to juvenile court jurisdiction.1 45 Re-
verse waiver exists in four of the ten prosecutorial waiver
jurisdictions,146 eleven of the thirty-eight legislative waiver jurisdic-
tions, 47 and seven of the forty-eight judicial waiver jurisdictions. 48
III. JUDICIAL WAIVER SERVES JUSTICE
The very existence of the juvenile justice system illustrates society's
commitment to helping its troubled youth. The Supreme Court, in
Kent v. United States'49 and In re Gault,5 0 substantiated that interest
142. Guttman, supra note 12, at 521; see Feld, supra note 37, at 701. Of course,
prosecutors still determine how to charge the juvenile. Jensen, supra note 20, at 181.
143. See e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(d) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995) (stating
that either party or the court may ask for a reverse waiver hearing); Del. Code Ann.
tit. 10, § 1011(a)-(b) (Supp. 1994) (permitting the Attorney General to reverse waive
a juvenile case or the juvenile to petition the court for reverse waiver).
144. DeL Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1011(a)-(b) (Supp. 1994); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-
5(b)(2)(B) (1994); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 640.010(3) (Mlichie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990 &
Supp. 1994); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-157(8) (Supp. 1995); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 62.080(3) (Michie Supp. 1995); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169-B:25 (1994 & Supp.
1995); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 190.71, 210.43 (McKinney 1993); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.
10, § 7306-1.1(E) (West Supp. 1996); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 6322(a) (1982 &
Supp. 1995); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 5505(a)-(b) (1991); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 970.032
(West Supp. 1995).
145. Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1011(a)-(b) (Supp. 1994); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 640.010(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990 & Supp. 1994); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-
157(8) (Supp. 1995); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-159(d) (Supp. 1995); Tex. Faro. Code
Ann. § 51.08 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-269.4 (Michie Supp.
1995); W. Va. Code § 49-5-100) (Supp. 1995).
146. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(d) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 43-261 (1993); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 5505(c) (1991); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-237(g)
(1986 & Supp. 1995).
147. See supra note 144.
148. See supra note 145.
149. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
150. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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by providing juveniles with procedural protections, including the right
to a hearing in judicial waiver cases before being transferred from ju-
venile court jurisdiction.151 In deciding these cases, the Supreme
Court manifested a firm belief in both the rehabilitative philosophy of
the juvenile justice system and in the idea that juvenile status does not
justify unceremonious and informal proceedings.'52 The Court thus
expressed a twofold concern: that juveniles receive broad procedural
protections and that those protections include full consideration of the
juveniles' best interests.
This part asserts that prosecutorial and legislative waiver operate in
contravention both of the purposes of the juvenile justice system and
of the Supreme Court's twofold concern. The part argues that judicial
waiver best ensures that juveniles receive procedural safeguards and
have their best interests protected because it alone provides juveniles
with a full hearing before subjecting them to the criminal justice
system.
A. Three Reasons Why Prosecutorial Waiver Does Not
Serve Justice
The scope of a prosecutor's virtually unfettered discretion makes
her an inappropriate party to make the waiver decision. Prosecutorial
waiver ignores the best interests of the juvenile, permits the prosecu-
tor to choose both the charge and the forum, and may place the prose-
cutor in the double bind of trying to ascertain the juvenile's best
interests while simultaneously attempting to represent the commu-
nity's best interests. Furthermore, prosecutorial waiver is not proce-
durally fair because it does not provide for a hearing or written
findings from which a juvenile can meaningfully appeal.
1. Ignoring Juveniles' Best Interests
A juvenile's best interests are not served by a system in which a
prosecutor does not have to consider those interests. Justice Douglas,
backed by Justices Brennan and Marshall in a vigorous dissent from
the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in a prosecutorial waiver
case, eloquently stated the problem:
A juvenile or "child" is placed in a more protected position than an
adult .... In that category [she] is theoretically subject to rehabilita-
tive treatment. Can [she], on the whim or caprice of a prosecutor,
be put in the class of the run-of-the-mill criminal defendants, with-
out any hearing, without any chance to be heard, without an oppor-
tunity to rebut the evidence against [her], without a chance of
151. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
152. See supra notes 58-63, 69, 74-76 and accompanying text.
2446 [Vol. 64
1996] WAIVER OF JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION 2447
showing that [she] is being *iVen an invidiously different treatment
from others in [her] group? 53
The answer is no. No situation exists in the criminal system analogous
to the unfettered discretion many prosecutors enjoy in choosing the
forum in which to try a juvenile. Although two states with
prosecutorial waiver statutes attempt to restrain this discretion by pro-
viding prosecutors with enumerated waiver considerations,'-' neither
statute focuses on the best interests of the juvenile. While the factors
provided in these two statutes are similar to those a judge must
weigh,'155 the juvenile's concern is that prosecutors in the majority of
prosecutorial waiver jurisdictions are not obliged to consider either
these factors 156 or the juvenile's best interests. Additionally,
prosecutorial waiver allows the party with an interest in conviction the
discretion to pick the court which provides harsher penalties. 1s7 This
omission is antithetical to the Supreme Court's expressed concern for
juvenile rights and for individualized, rehabilitative treatment;158 it ig-
nores the very foundations of the juvenile justice system.'5 9 More-
over, the prosecutor does not have to make written findings, so a
sparse record is available on which to argue an appeal. 6°
Proponents of prosecutorial waiver might argue that the opportu-
nity to be heard through appeal or through a reverse waiver process
affords juveniles adequate procedural protection. This position, how-
ever, ignores that these procedures are not universally available in
prosecutorial waiver jurisdictions. 6' Only four of the ten states with
prosecutorial waiver also have reverse waiver.'6 Of the other six
states, Colorado does not permit criminal court judges to send directly
filed cases to juvenile court, 63 and no other prosecutorial waiver stat-
ute explicitly guarantees the right to appeal." Any appeal of
153. United States v. Bland, 412 U.S. 909, 911 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
154. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-276 (1993); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-6-203(f)(iii), -237(b)
(1986 & Supp. 1995).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 98-101.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 121-24.
157. See State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 1003 (Utah 1995) (stating that Utah's
prosecutorial waiver statute "does not indicate what characteristics of the offender
mandate [the] choice" of forum; thus, the prosecutor has discretion to choose the
court). Of course, prosecutors are bound to serve justice. See Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, supra note 127, EC 7-13.
158. See supra part I.B.
159. See supra part LA.
160. Prosecutorial waiver is difficult to review meaningfully due to the lack of writ-
ten reasons for the waiver and the protected nature of prosecutorial discretion. See
Champion & Mays, supra note 24, at 72; infra note 165 and accompanying text.
161. See infra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
162. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(d) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 43-261 (1993); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 5505 (1991); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-237(g)
(1986 & Supp. 1995).
163. GAO Report, supra note 91, at 66.
164. The only prosecutorial waiver jurisdictions that statutorily guarantee the right
to appeal are Arkansas, Nebraska, Vermont, and Wyoming. See supra note 162.
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prosecutorial authority is difficult; on that subject, the Supreme Court
has written:
'This broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the deci-
sion to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such
factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deter-
rence value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the
case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan
are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are
competent to undertake.165
Prosecutorial waiver jurisdictions perceive the mechanism as a discre-
tionary function and thus require no written findings regarding the
prosecutor's reasons for her decision.166
Once in criminal court, the juvenile usually bears the burden of
proving that she should not be tried as an adult. 67 Conversely, in
juvenile court, the prosecutor bears the burden of proving that the
juvenile should not be subject to juvenile court jurisdiction.16 8 More-
over, even if a juvenile can appeal or petition the court for reverse
waiver, and if the court indeed transfers the juvenile to juvenile court,
the solution comes too late: the juvenile will have already suffered the
psychic trauma of being treated, albeit temporarily, as an adult crimi-
nal defendant. When Morris Kent's case was improperly transferred
to criminal court (through judicial waiver, but without a hearing), he
faced incarceration with adults and a possible death sentence, as op-
posed to a maximum of five years of treatment as a juvenile. 69 The
mere prospect of such a fate is undoubtedly detrimental to the juve-
nile who can be rehabilitated through juvenile court treatment. Even
165. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); see also Newman v. United
States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("Few subjects are less adapted to judicial
review than the exercise [of prosecutorial] discretion ...
166. See infra part III.A.2.
167. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 803 S.W.2d 502, 505-06 (Ark. 1991) (stating that the
party seeking to transfer the defendant has the burden of proof); State v. Buelow, 587
A.2d 948, 950 (Vt. 1990) (stating that the party petitioning the court for reverse
waiver to juvenile court when she has been statutorily excluded therefrom has the
burden of proof; because legislative and prosecutorial waiver are similar,
prosecutorial waiver likely places the burden of proof on the juvenile as well); Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 14-6-237(g) (1986 & Supp. 1995) (stating that, after a reverse waiver
hearing initiated by either party or the judge, the criminal court judge may transfer
the matter if she finds it "more properly suited to disposition" in juvenile court; pre-
sumably, the juvenile would have to persuade the judge to make this finding). But see
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-261 (1993) (stating that a juvenile's petition for reverse waiver
will be granted after the presentation of evidence by both parties at a hearing "unless
a sound basis exists for retaining jurisdiction").
168. This presumes, of course, that the prosecutor or the judge institutes the waiver
proceeding. If the juvenile herself petitions the court for waiver, she bears the burden
of proof. See supra note 167. But see S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 26-11-10 (Supp. 1995)
(stating that when the juvenile is 16 or older and charged with a violent or serious
felony, she must rebut the presumption that juvenile court jurisdiction should be
waived in order to avoid judicial waiver).
169. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553-54 (1966).
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if the juvenile is psychologically unharmed by her criminal court expe-
rience, her record may bear the blemish of the time she spent in crimi-
nal court prior to transfer to juvenile court.17 0
Most significantly, prosecutorial waiver denies a juvenile the oppor-
tunity for the "critically important"'171 hearing before she enters the
criminal justice system. A post-waiver hearing by a criminal court
judge is not equivalent to the waiver hearing held by a juvenile court
judge preceding her every waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction. Hold-
mg a waiver hearing is a common part of a juvenile court judge's regu-
lar duties, but is a more rare occurrence for most criminal court
judges."7 In the absence of statutory guidelines, the criminal court
judge who conducts a reverse waiver hearing will appraise a juvenile
in the light of the criminal court's punitive and retributive philoso-
phy.173 No persuasive reason exists to believe that the concerns raised
by the Supreme Court in Kent v. United States74 regarding judicial
waiver should not apply to the exercise of prosecutorial waiver. Like
a judge, a prosecutor has "a substantial degree of discretion" in mak-
ing the waiver decision, and thus should similarly not be permitted "to
determine in isolation and without the participation or any represen-
tation of the child the 'critically important' question whether a child
will be deprived of the special protections" of juvenile court.'
2. Choosing the Forum Is a Decision Distinct from Charging
Courts have upheld prosecutorial waiver as analogous to the charg-
ing decision. 6 Proponents of this view believe that the prosecutor's
charging discretion therefore justifies discretion in the waiver context.
This analysis, however, erroneously collapses two decisions into one.
Waiver is a distinct and unique function. Charging a juvenile suspect
with a crime involves examining the juvenile's age and the type of
offense she has allegedly committed.177 Waiving juvenile court juris-
diction entails an additional determination, after the charge, of the fo-
rum in which to try the case. 178 Thus, under a system of concurrent
170. See; e.g., In re R.D., 574 A.2d 160, 163 (Vt. 1990) (stating that juvenile pro-
ceedings for transfer from criminal to juvenile court are not confidential).
171. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 553.
172. Cf. Hearings, supra note 86, at 10 (stating that juveniles commit only one out
of eight violent crimes).
173. Boyce, supra note 46, at 995-96.
174. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
175. Id at 553.
176. See Russell v. Parratt, 543 F.2d 1214, 1216-17 (8th Cir. 1976); Myers v. District
Court, 518 P.2d 836, 838 (Colo. 1974) (en banc).
177. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
178. See State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 1003 (Utah 1995) (stating that selecting a
charge and selecting the trial forum are two different functions); supra text accompa-
nying note 109.
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jurisdiction, deciding how to charge the juvenile allows the prosecutor
to further choose the forum in which to try her. 179
In State v. Mohi,180 the Supreme Court of Utah overturned Utah's
prosecutorial waiver statute,'" examining the prosecutor's traditional
discretionary charging power and distinguishing it from the power to
choose the forum in which to file a juvenile case.'82 The court ac-
knowledged that selecting a charge based on the likelihood that cer-
tain elements of the offense would be proved at trial was "a necessary
step in the chain of any prosecution."' 8 3 The court reasoned that
prosecutorial discretion in this arena benefitted the public by promot-
ing judicial economy, allowing plea bargaining, and avoiding costly
and time-consuming criminal prosecutions. 184 The court noted, how-
ever, that these benefits did not extend to the prosecutor's choice of
forum in a juvenile case, stating "The elements of the offense are de-
termined by the charging decision, and it is only the charging decision
that is protected by traditional notions of prosecutor discretion."18 5
Charging, then, involves a determination of whether a crime has been
committed, while the decision to file a case in criminal court-to
waive juvenile court jurisdiction-is a subsequent step which impli-
cates a juvenile's interest in procedural fairness.
Choice of charge is simply one part of the prosecution of a juvenile
and, when the juvenile and criminal courts both have jurisdiction, it
precedes the choice of forum. Prosecutorial waiver thus allows the
prosecutor to determine without a hearing (and thus potentially with-
out regard to a juvenile's best interests) that a juvenile is not amena-
ble to juvenile court rehabilitation. While prosecutors traditionally
enjoy wide discretion in charging a suspect, 8 6 this discretion arguably
does not extend to determining where to file the case; the two func-
tions are separate. The choice of forum in cases involving
prosecutorial waiver thus should not be considered part of the tradi-
tionally protected use of prosecutorial discretion.18 7
179. 901 P.2d at 1003.
180. 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995).
181. Id. at 1002-04. But cf Chapman v. State, 385 S.E.2d 661, 663 (Ga. 1989) (hold-
ing that prosecutors may both charge a juvenile and choose the forum in which to file
her case because "the initial option to select a forum when concurrent jurisdiction
exists belongs to the litigant").
182. 901 P.2d at 1002-03.
183. Id. at 1003.
184. Id.
185. Id. (second emphasis added).
186. Id.; see supra note 165 and accompanying text.
187. Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1003.
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3. Requiring Prosecutors to Serve Two Masters: The Public and
the Juvenile
A prosecutor cannot serve justice when she must serve both the
state and the best interests of the juvenile at the same time.las More-
over, her dual role compromises the premises of the juvenile justice
system. As both a party to the suit and the representative of the state,
a prosecutor acting alone, in the absence of statutory criteria, is in a
poor position to represent the best interests of the child. Even in a
jurisdiction that provides statutory considerations (and thus requires
consideration of the juvenile's personal circumstances and of other
potentially mitigating factors), the most principled prosecutor will
have difficulty because she must also evaluate the state's interests,
which may include prosecution of the juvenile to the fullest extent of
the criminal law.'89
Commentators have rejected arguments by some government attor-
neys that, in an analogous situation, they can represent both sides in a
matter, such as when two agencies represented by the Attorney Gen-
eral are embroiled in a dispute.190 In the prosecutorial waiver situa-
tion, a prosecutor is asked not only to represent both the state and the
juvenile, but also to be the judge. This task is not only overwhelm-
ingly difficult and sensitive but also contrary to the legal ethics of our
adversarial system, which insist upon the "independent presentation
of... differing interests [to] enable those who judge in our society to
make better decisions." 91 Prosecutorial waiver does not serve this
decision-making process.
B. Legislative Waiver: Justice on Autopilot
Legislative waiver is more fair to juveniles than prosecutorial
waiver, but also more damaging; rather than involving even an arbi-
trary exercise of discretion, the exclusion from juvenile court is auto-
matic and offense-based.' 92 The mechanism thus does not provide any
opportunity before criminal court jurisdiction attaches for a hearing or
consideration of whether the juvenile is amenable to rehabilitation in
juvenile court. 93 In addition to this glaring problem, legislative
waiver duplicates the faults of prosecutorial waiver, including shifting
188. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility, supra note 127, EC 7-13.
189. See T. Kenneth Moran & John L. Cooper, Discretion and the Criminal Justice
Process 53 (1983).
190. See William Josephson & Russell Pearce, To Whom Does the Government
Lawyer Owe the Duty of Loyalty When Clients Are in Conflict?, 29 How. L.J. 539,
540-41 (1986).
191. Id. at 567.
192. Barry C. Feld, supra note 37, at 701-02; Guttman, supra note 12, at 521-22;
Martin J. O'Hara, Note, Is It a Crime to Live in Public Housing? A Proposal to the
Illinois General Assembly to Amend the Automatic Transfer Statute, 27 J. Marshall L
Rev 855, 864 (1994).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 98-101.
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the burden of proof to the juvenile, limiting the opportunity for mean-
ingful appeal, and stigmatizing and traumatizing the juvenile through
prosecution in criminal court-even if only on a temporary basis.9 4
Legislative waiver also contravenes the individualistic and rehabili-
tative philosophy of the juvenile justice system because it does not
take place on a case-by-case basis with an examination of the juve-
nile's life and the circumstances of her offense. By failing to provide a
hearing before determining the adjudicatory forum, legislative waiver
prevents a determination of the juvenile's best interests until after
those interests may have already been harmed through the juvenile's
time in criminal court.19 5 If the legislature has decided that the crime
with which the juvenile is charged should be tried in criminal court,
this waiver mechanism operates automatically to exclude her from ju-
venile court jurisdiction, blind to her best interests and in disregard of
any mitigating factors. The Supreme Court decried this sort of treat-
ment in Kent v. United States'96 when it forbade judicial waiver con-
ducted "without ceremony-without hearing, without effective
assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons."'197 Juveniles
must receive an opportunity to be heard before they are deemed un-
suited to juvenile court jurisdiction.
C. Serving the Purposes of the Juvenile Justice System and
Juveniles' Interests in Being Heard
Judicial waiver is the only waiver mechanism that provides a hear-
ing before a juvenile is sent to criminal court jurisdiction, thereby
serving the best interests of the juvenile and society. During the
waiver hearing, a juvenile court judge serves as a nonpartisan arbiter
of the dispute'98 and protector of the juvenile's rights.199 She per-
forms this task by independently and impartially 00 considering both
the evidence presented during the adversarial hearing and the per-
sonal circumstances of the juvenile.2 0 ' Because she is impartial and
not a party to the case, a judge's primary interest in the outcome is
that justice is done.202
194. See supra text accompanying notes 161-70.
195. See id.
196. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
197. d. at 554.
198. See Moran & Cooper, supra note 189, at 84.
199. See id. at 85 (stating that a judge's authority in the courtroom is given to her
"in the name of protecting the rights of the accused").
200. See ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canons 1 & 3 (1990).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102; see also Kent v. United States, 383
U.S. 541, 565-67 (1966) (advocating consideration of eight potentially mitigating fac-
tors in judicial waiver hearings).
202. See, e.g., Model Code of Judicial Conduct, supra note 200, Canon I(A) (stating
that "[an independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our
society").
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In pursuit of a just result, the judge looks beyond the mere probable
cause requirement that binds prosecutors. 3 She seeks not only evi-
dence that the juvenile committed the alleged offense, but also evi-
dence that the juvenile is not amenable to juvenile court treatment. 204
Because the judge is statutorily bound to consider potentially mitigat-
ing factors such as amenability to treatment, personal circumstances,
and lack of a prior record,2 5 her waiver decision accords the juvenile
the individualized treatment promised by the juvenile justice sys-
tem.206 As an added protection, the judge's decisions are subject to
meaningful review based on her written findings. 7
Judicial waiver thus provides an adversarial process in which the
interests of the juvenile and society may be weighed against each
other in a neutral setting to achieve a fair outcome.2° Procedure is
not provided at the expense of an opportunity for rehabilitation, and
the option remains available in particular cases to prosecute in crimi-
nal court juveniles charged with especially egregious crimes or deter-
mined not to be susceptible to rehabilitation in juvenile court.
While prosecutorial and legislative waiver may save courts the time
and expense of waiver hearings by making no provision for their oc-
currence, these mechanisms do not serve the purposes of the juvenile
justice system. Prosecutorial waiver allows a prosecutor to file juve-
nile cases in criminal court without full consideration of the juvenile's
individual circumstances or of other potentially mitigating factors; in
other words, without consideration of a juvenile's best interests. 2 l It
may also require a prosecutor to attempt simultaneously to represent
a juvenile's best interests and to serve the state, which may seek to
prosecute the juvenile.210 Legislative waiver similarly denies a juve-
nile the right to a hearing before she is subject to criminal court juris-
diction, also in abrogation of her best interests. 21' By contrast, and in
keeping with the Supreme Court's concerns regarding procedural fair-
ness for juveniles, judicial waiver provides for a full and impartial
hearing in juvenile court, including a balanced consideration of the
juvenile's best interests on a case-by-case basis,212 before criminal
court jurisdiction can attach.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 99, 127-28.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102.
205. I.
206. See supra part I.A.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04; Bishop & Frazier, supra note 6, at
301.
208. See Rubin, supra note 26, at 186-87 (advocating the initiation of all juvenile
cases in juvenile court with a judicial waiver proviso); Boyce, supra note 46, at 1008-
09 (same).
209. See supra parts III.A.1, III.A.2
210. See supra part llI.A.3.
211. See supra part II.B.
212. See supra parts LA, I.B., m.C.
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CONCLUSION
The decision to waive juvenile court jurisdiction and its rehabilita-
tive benefits in favor of punitive criminal court treatment is a decision
that can forever change a juvenile's life. In view of its monumental
importance, the decision should be made only after a full and impar-
tial consideration of the juvenile's individual circumstances and best
interests. Whereas prosecutorial and legislative waiver do not provide
a forum for this examination, judicial waiver does. Only judicial
waiver allows a juvenile to present her case to an impartial arbiter and
to receive the fairest treatment under the law. Society's investment in
and concern for its children mandates that it provide them every op-
portunity for rehabilitation before deeming them incorrigible-it de-
mands a judicial waiver hearing before every waiver of juvenile court
jurisdiction.
